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PUBLIC GARAGES AS NUISANCES PER SE
ROBERT RUPPIN

t

In dealing with the question to what extent and under what circumstances public garages constitute nuisances, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has laid down an unique doctrine, namely, that such garages in residential neighborhoods are nuisances per se, or, perhaps more accurately,
nuisances as a matter of law, by reason of environment. The question is
an important one and worthy of critical study, more especially because of
the pronounced leaning in several other jurisdictions toward the adoption
of the doctrine laid down'by the Pennsylvania court. Lawyers in active
practice are familiar with the constant recurrence of the question, and the
extent of its importance is indicated by the fact that in Pennsylvania alone,
since the decision in Prendergastv. Walls,' usually looked to as the source
of the doctrine, it has been before the appellate courts in one or another
closely similar form no less than twenty-eight times, and before the courts
of first instance of course much more often.
From a historical standpoint the doctrine is doubly.unique. Noise is
of course the distinguishing characteristic which marks out these establishments for special consideration; not, however, the noise of ordinary operation of motor vehicles, that is of their moving to and fro, even in large
numbers, for that, like other objectionable features, such as the dangers and
inconvenience due to congestion, od6rs, increased fire hazards, et cetera, and2
nuisance.
even when combined with them, will not of necessity constitute a
The noise which distinguishes the public garage is' the noise due to the repairing and servicing of motor vehicles-the pounding on metals, racing
of motors, et cetera, which always form the backbone of the complaint when
such establishments are attacked as nuisances. This noise, as has been 'said,
constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of the public garage, and the
reason why the Pennsylvania doctrine is historically unique is that in no
t A. B., 1918, Franklin and Marshall College; member of the bar of Lancaster County,
Court of Pennsylvania, and of the Supreme Court of the United States.
of the Supreme
Pa. 547, ioi Atl. 826 (1917).
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- See for example Brown v. Easterday, nio Neb. 729 at 734, 194 N. W. 798 at 8oo (1923),
where, in holding an oil and gasoline filling station in a reiderial district to be neither a
nuisance per se nor in fact, the court said: "Regarding the increase of traffic, the same reasoning would constitute a popular church a private nuisance, as it is a well-known fact that,
not only on Sundays, but on other days and nights, when the activities of churches are in progress, automobiles are parked for blocks in all directions and to a certain extent interfere with
the quiet enjoyment and privacy of homes in the vicinity, and yet these are but the trivial
inconveniences necessarily resulting from changes and improvements growing out of advancing civilization. The same may be said as to the glare of the, lights. . . . As to the disagreeable noises, the evidence does not convince us they are of such a character as to seriously interfere with the plaintiff's comfort and enjoyment of his home." And see Pennsylvania Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 290 Pa. 404, 138 Atl. 909 (1927), and Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274

(1868).
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other instance has the law declared an establishment to be a nuisance per se
3
whose only or chief objectionable attribute was noise.
Our ancestors do not seem to have been so sensitive to noise. Perhaps
before the Industrial Revolution there was no great occasion for them to
be so. At any rate, in the old books there is practically no mention of
noises as constituting nuisances, either in law or in fact. In a work as late
as Blackstone noise is not mentioned as a possible nuisance. Enumerating
the nuisances which affect a man's dwelling, Blackstone says that they may
be reduced to three: "i. Overhanging it: . .

2.

Stopping antient lights;

And 3., corrupting the air with noisome smells."
The old books are full of cases of nuisances, most of them cases of
interferences with easements, purprestures, 5 pollution and diversion of
water-ways., et cetera, and there are some cases of noisome odors ' (many of
the old cases deal with the distinction between trespass on the case and the
assize of nuisance), but cases of noises, with the exception of an interesting
case in Lutwyche, to be considered presently, are conspicuous by their absence.7 Certainly there is nowhere any indication that an establishment
may, by reason of noise, be considered a nuisance per se.'
"The test whether a nuisance exists through noise in any case depends upon all the
attendant conditions. It is not open to doubt that noise alone may constitute a nuisance ...
In order that a noise may amount to a nuisance, it must be harmful to the health or comfort
of ordinary people." Rugg, C. J., in Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486 at 488,
io4 N. E. 371 at 373 (1914).
"Noise alone may constitute a nuisance; but in determining whether it is a nuisance, the
character and volume, and the time, place, and duratioq of its occurrence, and the locality,
must be considered." Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N. J. Eq. 726 at 729, i33 Atl. 543 at 545 (1926).
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'For an unusual modern instance of this kind see Fugate v. Carter, 151 Va. Io8, 144
S. E. 483 (1928), where a garage was built in and over a public street, which however had
not been opened but merely laid out on a plan. The garage was held to be both a public and
a private nuisance.
'E. g. Jones v. Powell, Palmer 536, Hutton 135 (i651), where the combined odors of a
brewhouse and a "quandam latrinam" proved too much for the piaintiff.
The case of Rex v. Smith, i Strange 704 (1725), in which the defendant was convicted and fined on an indictment for "making great noises in the night with a speaking
trumpet to the disturbance of the neighborhood" is obviously of another type, and has been
disregarded. So also has this statement from Comyns (Dig., substit. "Action upon the Case
for a Nuisance.-C. When it does not Lie.") : "If a man set up a school so near my study,
who am of the profession of the law, that the noise interrupts my studies," as Comyns cites no
authority. By way of contrast to this statement see a recent case, where a barking dog
which annoyed a physician was held a nuisance. Hechelman v. Kindt, 22 Pa. D. R. 791
(I91).
' The well-known cases in which bowling alleys were held nuisances per se were based,
not on the noise incident to their operation, but on their "affording to the idle and dissolute
encouragement to continue in their destructive courses," State v. Haines, 3o Me. 65 (849),
and on their tendency to be converted into "nurseries of vice and crime." Tanner v. Trustees of the Village of Albion, 5 Hill 121 (N. Y. 1843). It is hardly necessary to add that
the modern cases have changed the rule and that bowling alleys are no longer nuisances per
se. Peragallo v. Luner, supra note 3; Hamilton Corp. v. Julian, 130 Md. 597, IOi. Atl. 558
(1917).
For a modern case, where a bowling alley located in a business section was held to be a
nuisance on the facts by reason of noise, see Briggs v. Vottler, 4 Wkly. Not. Cas. 272 (Pa.
1877).
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Tle case in Lutwyche is Bradley v. Gill,9 decided at the Hilary Term,
3 & 4 Jac. 2. It was an action for a nuisance, wherein it was alleged that
the defendant conducted "quandam Slhopam Fabrilem (Anglice a Smith's
Shop) ." and that he, "tevipore nocturno actempore matutino aite htcem di'ei
& ad. al' tewpora & horas intempestivas'
curn inalleis ferreis
percussit, ita quod per horribiles stridores; clangores, strepitus & sonitus
laboris & di'erberationis . . . dormire, quiescere seu inanere non potuer'
nec possunt." The defendant pleaded that for more than twenty years he
had been occupied as a smith in Stowrbridge, and that the plaintiff had
invited him to use his trade there. The court sfistained a demurrer to the
plea, hold*ing that the action lay, that the plea did not respond to the declaration, and that the "traverse fuit idle." But by consent the defendant had
leave to amend. The case was of course dealt with as one involving a
nuisance in fact rather than a nuisance per se. It will be noted that the
declaration, with its "horribiles stridores, ulangores, strepitus & sonitus"'
humorously foreshadows the complaints in the garage cases of today. The
allegation of hammering "cum nalleis ferreis" is the literal forerunner of
the now stereotyped allegation of pounding and striking on metal met witlh
in practically every garage case.
For about a hundred and fifty years there do not seem to have been
any .similar cases reported in England. Then, near the middle of the nineteenth century, we find a number of cases, some of them, as might be anticipated, resulting from the use of steam, and we find the interposition of
equity to enjoin noises and other nuisances becoming frequent."
As for
example, in Ball v. Ray,' 2 where the keeping of horses next to a dwelling
was enjoined because of the noise issuing from the stable.
At about the same time we have the first reported case in Pennsylvania
in which noise was held to be a nuisance-Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3 where a
tin-smith's and sheet-iron worker's shop was held to be a nuisance in fact.
Cases of noises as nuisances had by this time become frequent, and of
course there never could be any doubt as to the general principle that excessive noise might constitute a nuisancc in fact, the test being whether the
I LutNyche 69 (1688).
"An amusing literary parallel of a much earlier date may be recalled in Chaucer, in the
Miller's Tale, where Gervais the smith was sharpening, "schar and cultre bysily" at a time
wheli, we are told, "Derk was the night as picche or as a cole."

nFor the origin and antiquity of the jurisdiction of equity to restrain nuisances, see
Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Myl. & K. 169 (1834) ; I A-MES, CAsZS IN ]EQUITY JURISDICTIOI
(I9O4), Ch. 4, § 4, P. 553 ff., and 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (3d ed., 1923),
249 et passim.
2'L. R. 8 Ch. App. 467 (1873). And see Broder v. Saillard, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 692 (1876),
where a similar situation existed. Also Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. N. C. 134 (1835);
Dawson v. Moore, 7 C. & P. 25 (1835) ; Eaden v. Firth, I Hemming & Miller 573 (1863) ;
Gaunt v. Finney, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 8 (1872), and Mumford v. Oxford, etc., Ry. Co., I H. &
N. 34 (1856).
W3 Grant 39o (Pa. 1862).
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noise was such "as to interfere with the ordinary use and enjoyment" of
the dwelling house "so as to cause serious annoyance and disturbance." "
With the introduction of the automobile and the establishment of public
garages, the Pennsylvania court began the development of the anomalous
doctrine which has been referred to, and which, as stated in its own language, is that a public garage is not a nuisance per se but becomes one when
established in a residential district.
To say that a thing which is not a nuisance per se may become one
under certain circumstances is, obviously, a contradiction in terms. A
nuisance per se is "a nuisance in itself, and which therefore cannot be so
conducted or maintained as to be lawfully carried on or permitted to
exist," 15 that is, it is something which is a nuisance at all times and places
and under all circumstances. In spite of the instinctive tendency to call up
the image of the saxophone player, it is difficult to conceive of such
nuisances. It is even possible to believe that amidst the bagpiping of the
Scotch Highlanders the saxophone might not be an unwelcome diversion. 10
The fact is that the term "nuisance per se" is and always has been unsatisfactory. Strictly construed it is doubtful whether any such thing exists,
and the declaration of the Pennsylvania court, while literally incorrect, is
not so entirely illogical as on first blush it seems to be. As well said by
Kephart, J., in Nesbit v. Riesenman,1 7 "We know that a horse-boiling
factory is a nuisance per se if a use of property is attempted for that purpose within inhabited territory, yet situated distant from any habitation it
certainly would not be a nuisance." '8
The origin and development of the Pennsylvania rule are interesting.
Prendergast v. Walls 19 is usually cited as the case in which it originated.
It certainly is the first reported case in the Pennsylvania appellate courts on
the subject.2 0 But when we examine the report we find, as in so many
other instances, that it is very far from laying down the rule for which it is
cited. The establishment sought to be enjoined, and ultimately enjoined,
R., in Broder v. Saillard, supra note 12.
" Sir George Jessel, M.
' Cooper v. Whissen, 95 Ark. 545, 130 S. W. 703 (910).
" See Miller v. Jersey Coast Resorts Corp., 98 N. J.Eq. 289 at 299, 13o Atl. 824 at 828
(1925), where it was said: "It is quite true that a class of music which may be entertaining
to one may be annoying to another, but those who enjoy the modern jazz cannot be restrained
from producing it because it offends the classical ear."
17298 Pa. 475 at 485, 148 Atl. 695 at 698 (1930).
""The phrase 'nuisance per se' is misleading. It often has been inappropriately employed. Strictly speaking, no act or omission is a nuisance regardless of surrounding conditions. No one can create a nuisance in the absence of some one affected by the former's act
or omission. A slaughterhouse that would annoy no one if situated in an uninhabited gulch
might be an intolerable menace to health when located in the residence sections of a city or
town. The circumstances may be such as to render the most exquisite music both annoying
and injurious." Colton v. South Dakota Central Land Co., 25 S.D. 309 at 313, 126 N. W.
507at 5o8 (I910).
"Supra note i.
' Hibberd v. Edwards, 235 Pa. 454, 84 Atl. 437 (1912), was a garage case, but no question of nuisance was involved. The erection and maintenance of the garage were held to
violate a building restriction.
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was a one-story public garage at the corner of 38th and Chestnut Streets in
Philadelphia. The chancellor found a's facts that the immediate neighborhood was exclusively residential in character, and that by the erection of
the, garage the peaceful enjoyment of the homes Wtould be permanently
interfered with, the lives and safety of children endangered, worship in
nearby churches interfered with, values of surrounding properties reduced
and insurance rates increased. These findings were based on the' primary
findings that if the garage were erected and operated according to specifications, there would be noises, resulting 'from pounding on metals, testing of
engines, speeding and racing of motors, arid continuous sounding 6f horns,
odors from gasoline and smoke from motors, that the exit and entrance of
cars would be dangerous to pedestrians and especially to children, that there
would be congregating of persons in and about the property, and 'danger
of conflagration. The chancellor held that under the facts found the proposed garage would be a nuisance. In a brief Per Curiam opinion the
Supreme Court affirmed the decree, specifically on the chancellor's, findings
of facts.
In Hohl v: Modell 2" there was a restriction "that there shall not be
erected upon said 'lot . .

.

any establishment for ,

.'.

any offensive

business." The chancellor restraind the enlargement of ii public storage
garage holding ten 'cars- so that if would house tweity-four cars, on the
ground that such a. establishment carme Wiithin the restriction, finding that
the section was exclusively residentia iid making the: usual findings that
there would be pounding on metals, etc. On appeal, the court affirmed the
chancellor's findings and con'ctusions, and, citing Prendergast v. Walls,
added: "Equity ,ay 22 restrain as a nuisance the operation of a public service
garage in an exclusively residence section; aside from any buildiig" restriction."
In Phillips v. Donaldson23 there was a restriction against the carrying
on of any "noxious or offensive trade, business or employment, to the hurt,
damage or annoyance of otheis who have purchased or may hereafter purchase in said plan." -A bill was filed against the Operation of a public
garage. The court below dismissed the bill, holding that it was necessary
to show a public nuisance to bring the use within the restriction. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding there was evidence from which the chancellor should have found that the proposed use w'voiuld be "offensive" in
violation of the restriction. It refused to decide whether a garage in a
residential district constituted a nuisance as a matter of law, iithout regard
to its effect upon the neighboring properties, and said: "It is argued we
should take judicial notice of the fact that in the operation.ofa public garage
Pa. S16, 1o7 Atl. 885 (i919).
Italics the writer's.
"'269 Pa. 244 at 247, 112 Atl. 236 at
al264

238 (920).
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there exist such accompanying disturbances or other conditions as will make
it obnoxious and a violation of the covenant, urging that, without proof of
4
probable annoying conduct, it would be a nuisance in a residentialdistrict.
Because of their extensive use and the general knowledge of such use, we
might be inclined to agree, but it is not necessary to so decide in the present
case," .23 holding that under the evidence an offensive use had been shown.
In Hunter v. Wood 21 there was a restriction that the premises should
not be used as a "commercial establishment or for any offensive purpose
or occupation." The building to be erected was to be used partly as an
automobile showroom, and partly as a public garage and service station.
This was held to come within the restriction. The court added what was
unnecessary to the decision, that "this Court has heretofore held that a
public garage in a residential section is a nuisance regardless of the violation
of a restriction in a deed forbidding the use of the premises for offensive
purposes or occupation," citing Prendergastv. Walls, Hohl v. Modell and
Phillips v. Donaldson.
In Slingluff v. Tysonl 27 it was proposed to erect a showroom, and a
service station to be used merely for the purpose of rendering service to
each purchaser of a Paige or Jewett automobile. No machinery of any
kind was to be installed, and only minor repairs were to be made on the
premises, it being intended to send the cars to other establishments for
major repairs. No gasoline or oil was to be stored for sale. The court
made the usual finding of facts, much as in Prendergastv. Walls, as to the
proposed business. On appeal the Supreme Court said, "While a business
of this character might be unobjectionable where comparatively few cars
of the type mentioned are sold and used, yet it is a matter of general knowledge that Paige cars are used extenisively and, judging by the size of defendant's proposed building, the number of cars brought in for service and
minor repairs would be so large as to practically eliminate all difference
between defendant's business and that of the average public garage." And
further, "The operation of a public garage in a neighborhood of this character should be restrained as a public nuisance."
Tyson v. Coder 28 was decided by the Superior Court. The proposed
erection was a public garage and the chancellor made the usual findings in
the event that "the proposed garagz is erected and operated according to
the plans." 2,9 The court said, "It may be considered as a settled principle
of equity therefore that the business of maintaining a public service garage
in a municipal neighborhood exclusively residential will be restrained where
Italics the writer's.
Italics the writer's.

15o, 120 AtI. 781 (1923).
206 at 208, 124 At. 42o at
"83 Pa. Super. ii6 at 124 (1924).
'277
1280

Pa.
Pa.

' Italics the writer's.

421 (1924).
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such business is shown to be destructive of or prejudicial to the quiet and
orderly condition of the neighborhood and the comfort and enjoyment of
occupants of the residences in the vicinity " because of noises, offensive
odors, and the obstruction of the streets and footways incident to the business proposed to be carried on."
In Mitchell v. Guaranty Corporation ' we first see the present doctrine
stated in an unequivocal form. The court said, "A public garage, from
which a public service station differs only in name (Slingluff, et al., v. Tyson,
280 Pa. 2o6), is not a nuisance per se, but becomes such in fact when conducted in a residential neighborhood," 32 for which it cited Prendergastv.
Walls, Slingluff v. Tyson, Hunter v. Wood, Phillips v. Donaldson, t1ohl v.
M11odell, Hibberd v. Edwards and Tyson v. Coder, going on to say, after a
discussion of the findings, "The annoyances incident to the business of a
public garage, or public service station, regardless of the marnner of iti construction or operation,33 are such as to require its exclusion from residential
neighborhoods." 34
That this decision was understood by the lower courts as laying down
an unvarying rule is evidenced by the case of Fleagle v. Stokes,3 5 where it
was said, "It is now well established in Pennsylvania that a public garage,
though not a nuisance per se, becomes such in fact when conducted in, a
residential neighborhood .

.

. He [the defendant] has planned to take

every precaution possible against fire, and to reduce the annoyance of the
business by every possible means. But in view of the positive rulings of
the appellate courts, there is but one question for determination, and this is
a question of fact-Is the immediate neighborhood where the intended
garage is to be built predominantly residential in character ?"
The rule thus laid down was confined to public garages. As to private
garages the general rule was still applied, iri
LaRossa v.Forte ", and George
37
v. Goodovich. In the lattei" case a series of individual private garages on
both sides of a narrow alley was held a nuisance in a residential district, on
findings of noise, odors, etc., and in which the court said: "The question as
to what constitutes a nuisance depends upon the nature and result of the
acts of which complaint is made and not upon the means by which produced
or the particular description applied to them." - In Pennsylvania Comnpany
v. Sun Oil Company 3s a demiirre: to a bill to enjoin the erection of gasoline
tanks was sustained because of the absei-ce of an averment that the tanks
Italics the writer's.

M283 Pa. 361, 129 Atl. 114 (1925).

'Italics the writer's.

"Italics the writer's.
" But see what was said of this case in Burke v. Hollinger,
York Co. 193 at i94 (Pa. 1927).
"92 Pa. Super. 450 (1927).
"288 Pa. 48, 135 Atl. 719 (1927).
Supra note 2.
"40

infra note 42.
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were improperly constructed or equipped. In- distinguishing such tanks
from nuisances per se, the court cited as an example of the latter, "a public
garage, which is inseparable from the noise of pounding metals, noxious
odors, racing motors, and other affecting causes." Phillips v. Donaldson,
Hibberd v. Edwards and Prendergastv. Walls were cited.
In Carney v. Penn Oil Company 31 public service gasoline and filling
stations were brought under the ban, and the operation of such a station,
which had been erected before the bringing of the suit, was enjoined,
although there was testimony of noises, vibrations, blowing horns, changing
tires, racing engines, etc., and corresponding findings of fact which rendered
the application of the doctrine of Mitchell v. Guaranty Corporation unnecessary.
In Lader v. Siegel, (No. 1) 40 the new rule was reiterated. No repair
work was to be done in the proposed garage, which was to be used for
storage and for the supply of gasoline to motors stored there. The building
was attractive, congestion was minimized by a large entrance, the construction was designed to decrease noise, and a ventilating system was installed
to remove odors, as to which however the court said, "It may be observed,
the transfer of the same to the outside air will not protect the neighborhood
from the injury arising from the pollution of the atmosphere." In enjoining the operation of the garage the court said: "A given business will .
constitute a nuisance per se when it is generally known to be injurious to
health and to cause legal damage to property in certain localities and surroundings, regardless of how it may be carried on, for the common experience of mankind, of which the courts take judicial notice, proves this
to be the result, and such pursuits in certain areas are to be prohibited.
. Though a public garage
Penna. Co. v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 410.
is not a nuisance in itself, yei it becomes such when conducted in a residential
neighborhood.

.

.

.

Having determined the character of the counnunity,

and use of the building intended, it was unnecessary to specifically find it
constituted a nuisance in fact, for this conclusion followed as a matter of
law." 41 Refusing appellants' suggestion that permission be granted to
operate under the court's supervision, to demonstrate that no injury in fact
would result, the court said: "We have held that the present intended use is
a nuisance per se when carried on in a residential community, and to permit
experiments in separate instances, to determine the extent of the harm
suffered, would lead to endless disputes."
In the next case, Burke v. Hollinger,4 " the court was brought face to
face with the intolerable consequences of an inflexible application of the
s291 Pa.

371, 14o Atl. i33 (928).
°293 Pa. 306 at 309, 142 Atl. 272 at -73 (1928).
Italics the writer's.
*'296 Pa. 510, 146 Atl. ii5 (1929).
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doctrine which it had laid down, by a situation which required, as it rather
cryptically remarked, "not a modification of our rules as announced in the
previQus cases, but a limitation of their effect in given localities under certain conditions," adding that "The rule that a public garage is a nuisance
per se in a residential district was first announced many years ago. 43 It
must be observed, without receding from this rule, that some of the reasons
which prompted it have in different localities disappeared while others remain." The application of the doctrine, if applied as it was invoked in that
case, would have barred public garages from extensive sections of the city
of Philadelphia and of other large cities, solely on the ground that those
sections were predominantly residential in character. The inconvenience
thus brought about, as the court was quick to realize, would have far outweighed the disadvantages resulting from the erection of garages, which
might not necessarily from their-mode of operation cause serious annoyance
or physical damage.44 The facts were that a garage on Latimer Street, a
small side street in Philadelphia, commercial in character, was sought to
be enlarged so as to run through to Spruce Street, a residential street between Fifteenth and *Sixteenth streets. The entrance to the garage was to
remain on Latimer Street, no entrance was to be constructed on Spruce
Street, and there was to be nothiig inthe design of the Spruce Street side
of the building to indicate that it was t6 be used as a garage. In the rear
section, facing Spruce Street, no"cars Were to be washed or repaired. A
solid wall was to be constructed on both sides, and gases were to be removed
so as not to cause noticeable impurities ifn the air. The entire structure
was to house three hundred and fifty cars. The court based its refusal to
enjoin the construction on the ground that the district in question, although
residential in character, bordered on a large and expanding commercial district, and that therefore the convenience of the construction to the public
4
5
Certainly, so far
outweighed the annoyance which might result from it.
as inhabitants of the residential district are concerned, there is no logic in
saying that the proximity of a commercial district would result in any
excess of cohvenience which would overbalance the consequent annoyance
of public garages. In fact the logic is all the other way. The proximity
of a commercial district in which garages could be operated without restriction would render less necessary, and consequently less convenient, the
Four, to be exact. Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp., supra note 31.
" See Ladner v. Siegel (No. 2), 296 Pa. 579 at 589, 146 Atl. 71o at 712 (1929), where it
was said: "A policy which continues to shut out all accommodation for automobiles in residential sections such as this one must necessarily inconvenience the traffic. It must seriously
challenge judicial attention, as such districts are thickly inhabited centers."
" See this idea expressed in Rankett's Case, 3 Ja. B. R. (Fol. 139) : "If a man makes
candles in a vill, by which hc causes a noisome scent to the inhabitants, yet this is not a
nusance; for the needfulness of them will dispense with the noisomeness of the smell." Cited
in 16 VINER's ABR. 23; subtit. Nuisance (F). But see the note therein. See also Bloch v.
McCown, infra note 59, and Nevins v. MfcGavack, infra note 6o.
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presence of public garages within the residential district itself. As to the
occupants of the commercial district, garages for their convenience may be
erected in the commercial district itself, without restriction, and there is no
necessity for lifting the ban in residential districts on their behalf. The
reason given by the court, that "the acquisition of expensive land in strictly
commercial centers is often out of the question," is not very cogent. The
court however proceeded to modify its previously announced rule by setting
up a classification into three distinct types of districts, its decision therefore
becoming nothing more nor less than a zoning regulation. It said: "The
manner of construction and operation of a public garage becomes important
in determining, in certain districts,46 whether its use should be prohibited.
Other important considerations make it necessary for an advance to be
made in the law governing the use of buildings for public garages.
When considering the location of a public garage, the reasons for prohibiting it must be limited in the third type when that district reaches or bears
on a commercial center in a rapidly growing city." And this from a court
which had set aside the report of a master which held that a steam planing
mill "could hardly, in the common course of things, be used without working mischief to the properties of the plaintiffs and other property in the
neighborhood-by causing annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort; by
exposing such property to the risk of destruction or damage by fire; and by
depreciating its value and hindering improvements of a class suited to, and
such as would naturally seek that locality," and said that it presented for
consideration "a subject not within our sphere of judicial action. It presents a question of policy whether a part or portion of a city ought to be
devoted exclusively to private residences or other special objects; and that
is manifestly for the local authorities or the legislature to determine, and
not us. That concerns alone the public, and not private parties. With
peoples' rights we deal in cases like the present, and not with questions of
mere policy, local or general." 47 The court disposed of Mitchell v. Guaranty Corporation by saying, "The ruling consideration in that case may
safely rest on the principle that the decision of the chancellor, not being an
abuse of discretion, is final. There were circumstances there mentioned
which justified the order, the degree of proximity of near-by businesses and
the danger to school children being prominent."
In Ladner v. Siegel (No. 2) 4' the rule as modified in Burke v. Hollinger was applied. This was a proceeding for contempt arising out of an
alleged violation of the injunction in the previous case. The defendants
had attempted the establishment of the garage according to modified plans.
The Superior Court held that in so doing the defendants had not violated
. Italics the writer's.
c, Rhodes v. Dunbar, supra note
,8 Supra note 44.

2.
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the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, but in
view of the modification which, in the interim, had been made in Burke v.
Hollinger and which was applicable, modified its original judgment, subject
to the defendants purging themselves of the contempt. The Supreme Court
*said: "The use of a building for the storage, service or repair of a number
of automobiles is not a nuisance per se, in a section devoted to business purposes (Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244), as this statement is further
explained in the Eollinger Case,, but such use for any of these purposes does
become a nuisance per se'in a residential section. - In considering-the place
where the use was !:ibe made, the prinary question was and still is whether
the section is e±tiusively residential; a§ to such the use was and still is a
nuisance per se.
In third class residential districts a garage properly
built to, under or around an apartment house is not a nuisance per se. Its
use, however, from ihe fact of operation may become a nuisance. In such
districts the method of construction and operation should conform to that
laid down in the Hollinger.case."
In Nesbit v. Riesenmnan 49 the original rule was applied in its full
rigor to a case arising in. a small city, and the constitutional right of the
court to make and enforce a classification of this kind was upheld.5 0 In
Long v.Firestone 51 the.same rule was again affirmed in enjoining the operation of a filling and service station in a residential district of the City of
Reading. In Sprout v. Levinson '2 the converse df the rule--that in a
non-residential distfici 'an actual nuisance must be shown-was reaffirmed.
The sunitotal of the decisions in Pennsylvania to date seems to be
that outside of large citiesL..and what that term includes has yet-to be
decided-a public garage, flling or service station is*a nuisance as a matter
of law, in a residential district, regardless of the manner of its 'construction
or operation. In large'cities .the classification laid down in Barke v. Hollinger is to be applied, and ifjthe section in questionn; although residential,
borders on a commercial district, to warrant the injunction or abatement of
the establishment there must be proof that its operation'would constitute a
nuisance in fact.
The dangers of this doctrine, which so far as logic is concerned, paves
the way for courts to restrict the legitimate operation of businesses in certain sections, even in the face of proof that the operation will not result in
what has been hitherto recognized as a nuisance,- is apparent without the
necessity of much supporting reasoning,5 3 and it ishardly necessary to add
*' Supra note I7.

ro Certioraridenied; 281

U. S. 754, 50 Sup. Ct. 4 0S (193Q).

M303 Pa. 208, 154 Atl. 364 (1931).
&298
Pa. 400, 148 At. 51i (1930).
See for example, Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N. W.. 507 (1917), a case antedating
the Pennsylvania garage cases, where an undertaking eitablishment was excluded from a
residential section without proof of actual injury.
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that the doctrine thus laid down by the Pennsylvania court is opposed to
the weight of authority.
In some jurisdictions the suggestion that a public garage is a nuisance
per se in a residential district has been expressly repudiated. In Brown v.
Easterday34 for example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska said, in a case
involving an oil and gasoline filling station located in a residential district:
"The contention is made that the location in question is in a purely residence
district, which should not be invaded for the purpose contemplated. A sufficient answer would seem to be that, in the absence of legislation dividing
the city into zones and having a general application to all property within
the respective sections, it is not within the power of the courts to interfere
with the lawful use of property by the owner." And in Sherman v. Levingston, 55 Merrell, J., said: "I am convinced that a public garage may be so
conducted that its objectionable features may be eliminated, or at least
minimized to an extent that its operation will not unduly annoy or inconvenience those who reside nearby." '6 In Texas and Michigan the trend,
as evidenced by the expressions of the courts, is in the direction of the Pennsylvania rule. There has been however no direct adoption of the rule, the
expressions in favor of it being first in a case in which on the facts a garage
was held to be a nuisance, 5 7 and second in a case in which the district was
held not to be a residential one."
The nearest approach to the adoption of
the Pennsylvania doctrine is in Bloch v. McCown,"9 where the Alabama
court held, on a demurrer to a bill filed to enjoin the operation of a gasoline filling station and tire repair shop, which averred merely the "inevitable incidents" of operation of such an establishment, that the demurrer
should be overruled, saying: "The facts remain to be proved, though the
bill may be aided to some extent by common knowledge." The prior decision in Nevins v. McGavack, 0° where the court had held the question to be
one of fact, was distinguished, on the ground that there was a general public necessity for the existence of garages, but none for the existence of gasoline filling stations and tire repair shops. The Pennsylvania case of Tyson
v. Coder was cited and followed with approval.
The Pennsylvania doctrine stands upon a false premise, namely, that
injury to the neighborhood is an inevitable and necessary consequence of
Supra note 2.
128 N. Y. Supp. 581 at 583 (191o).
'Pauly v. Montgomery, 2o9 Iowa 699, 228 N. W. 648 (193o) ; State v. Wade, 128 Kan.
646, 278 Pac. lO67 (1929) ; True v. McAlpine, 81 N. H. 314, 125 Atl. 68o (1924); Bourgeois
v. Miller, 89 N. J. Eq. 285, io4 Atl. 383 (918), accord. And see Ballstadt v. Pagel, 2o2 Wis.
484, 232 N. W. 862 (1930).
57 L.ewis v. Berney, 230 S. W. 2,6 (Tex. Civ. App. 192;).
' Moore v. Johnson, 245 Mich. 173, 222 N. W.

120 (1928).

"A careful perusal of the

cases decided in other jurisdictions leads to the conclusion that each case must stand or fall
largely upon its own facts." Ballstadt v. Pagel, supra note 56 at 489, 232 N. W. at 864.
5921g Ala. 656, 123 S. 213 (1929).
o214 Ala. 93, io6 S. 597 (925).
See the dissent of Gardner, J., who said, citing the
Pennsylvania cases: "Its objectionable features are inherent in the business."
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the operation of a public garage. That this is no longer a fact is evidenced
by the cases themselves which have endeavored to adhere to the rule in the
face of demonstration that such consequences may be dispensed with. Nor
is it any longer necessary from an aesthetic standpoint that these establishments, be barred from residential districts, even if such considerations were
sufficient to sustain the doctrine, 61 as shown by the leading cases of Burke
v. Hollizger and Ladner v. Siegel, where it was part of the case proposed
to be established that the garages would conform to the general aesthetic
and artistic requirements and standards of architecture of the neighborhood.
The doctrine therefore resolves itself into a purely arbitrary one, to wit,
that by judicial fiat public garages may not be established in residential
neighborhoods.
Regardless of the consideration that to invoke judicial interference
some resident of the neighborhood must have at least a fancied grievance
and some private interest, and that therefore the doctrine laid down by the
courts does not operate automatically to exclude garages from residential
neighborhoods, which, it may be remarked, is also to a certain extent true
of legislation, it is the principle laid down that is dangerous, that is, that
.courts may depart from the rules of the common law, and, conceding that
certain things are neither nuisances per se by the old law, nor, in the orthodox sense, by the present law, hold them to be nuisances per se in certain
rules for determining
restricted localities, and then superimpose arbitrary
2
localities.
those
of
character
the nature and
The progress of modern science does not justify anything being called
a nuisance per se which is not contra bonos mores, because, as has been
demonstrated in these garage cases, that which may seem to be the inevitable
consequence of a trade or industry in one decade may have been entirely
eliminated by the arrival of the next decade. It is particularly vital that
establishments which are useful and of some benefit to a community shall
not be excluded therefrom by reason of pre-conceived notions as to their
inevitable consequences, but that each case shall be left to its own facts,
and that the old and well grounded rule shall be maintained that a nuisance
must be proven by showing that its maintenance will either cause actual
physical damage to property or a substantial interference with health and
3
comfort. As said by Lord Selborne in Gaunt v. Finney, "A nuisance of
this kind is much more difficult to prove than when the injury complained
-As to this, see Neff v. Gorman, 303 Pa. i86, 54 At. 293 (I93I), holding that an "eyesore" may be a nuisance, and Walnut & Quince St. Corp. v. Mills, 303 Pa, 25, 154 Atl. 29
(193).
The rules to be applied in making this determination are set forth in Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp., supra note 31; Nesbit v. Riesenman, supra note 17, and Burke v. Hollinger, supra
note 42, and in Krocker v. Westmoreland Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922) ; Hamilton
v. Bates, 284 Pa. 513, 131 Atl. 369 (192-5); and Unger v. Edgewood Garage, 287 Pa. 14, 134
Atl. 394 (1926).
01Supra note 12.
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of is the demonstrable effect of a visible and tangible cause," but the difficulty of proof should not dispense with the necessity of showing something
beyond a mere fanciful or imaginary injury, and we may agree with the
statement in the same case that, "a nuisance by noise (supposing malice to
be out of the question) is emphatically a question of degree."
The Pennsylvania cases lay down a doctrine which is not only illadvised, but which was originally based upon a line of cases giving it no
support, and the later cases, which laid it down unequivocally and gave it
general application, being already weakened by the modification introduced
in Burke v. Hollinger, should, when the proper occasion arises, be overruled.
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" Since this article is written the cases of Yeager v. Traylor, 16o Atl. io8 (Pa. 1932),
and Pilling v. Moore, I6o Atl. io9 (Pa. 1932), have been decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. They have further modified the rules, by giving to owners of apartment
houses the right to attach garages for the use of their tenants, even in residential sections
of smaller cities.

